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The EU and international dispute 
settlement
Allan Rosas*
This article focuses on recent developments with regard to the 
mechanisms for international dispute settlement which the EU has 
accepted or in some instances promoted, or which in any case are of 
direct relevance for the EU. As a preliminary question, the case law of 
the European Court of Justice concerning the compatibility of inter-
national dispute settlement mechanisms will be analysed. The article 
then provides an overview of such mechanisms included in multilat-
eral and bilateral agreements concluded by the EU, with a particular 
emphasis on recent bilateral trade and cooperation agreements. The 
last parts of the article look at specific institutional problems such as 
the question of the representation of the EU before international dispute 
settlement mechanisms, and the special challenges posed by investment 
disputes and, in this context, investor-to-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS), including ISDS mechanisms in bilateral investment agreements 
concluded between the EU Member States.
1. Introduction
As an economic and political union of states, based largely on a 
‘federative’ model, the EU has entered into a number of international 
agreements and other commitments, including membership in several 
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intergovernmental organizations, and is, according to the Court of Justice 
(hereinafter ECJ1), also bound by general international law.2 According 
to Article 3(5) of the Treaty on European Union (hereinafter TEU), the 
Union shall contribute to the ‘strict observance and the development 
of international law, including respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter’. Similar language is to be found in Article 21(1) TEU.
Given the vast array of international legal obligations incumbent 
upon the Union, and the important economic and political interests 
at stake, it is inevitable that the Union be faced with disagreements 
and disputes with third powers concerning the interpretation and 
application of these obligations. In order to demonstrate openness 
towards international law and the third-party settlement of disputes, 
and to channel the settlement of disputes into predictable fora and 
procedures, the EU has initiated or at least accepted a certain number 
of mechanisms involving such third-party settlement.
This was not always the case, however. In the 1980s, the approach 
of the EU to binding third-party settlement was one of caution and 
restraint.3 The exceptional and very few cases of extension of the ECJ’s 
jurisdiction to certain non-Member States,4 and the powers of the EFTA 
Court (Court of Justice of the European Free Trade Association States) 
under the Agreement on a European Economic Area (hereinafter 
EEA), are no real exceptions in this regard, as these mechanisms are 
intended to ensure the ECJ’s own jurisdiction or, in the case of the EEA 
Agreement and the EFTA Court, to ensure the application of EU internal 
market law in the three non-EU EEA States.5
In contrast, the EU acceptance of, and one could add, increasingly 
active support for, the reinforced GATT/World Trade Organization 
1 The abbreviation CJEU, which stands for ‘Court of Justice of the European Union’, refers 
to both the Court of Justice (ECJ) and the General Court (former Court of First Instance), 
see Article 19(1) TEU. In the following, reference is made almost exclusively to the ECJ, as 
the case law discussed emanates from this Court.
2 See, in particular, Case C-286/90 Poulsen and Diva Navigation EU:C:1992:453, paras 
9–10; Case C-162/96 Racke EU:C:1998:293, paras 45–6; Case C-366/10 The Air Transport 
Association of America and Others EU:C:2011:864, para 101. See also, e.g. A Gianelli, 
‘Customary International Law in the European Union’ in E Cannizzaro, P Palchetti and RA 
Wessels (eds), International Law as Law of the European Union (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
2012) 93.
3 A Rosas, ‘International Dispute Settlement: EU Practices and Procedures’ (2003) 46 
GYIL 284, 288.
4 On such particular cases, including the EC–Turkey Association Agreement of 1963, see 
Rosas ibid 289–92.
5 The EEA Agreement was concluded by the EU by Council Decision 94/1 ECSC, EC of 13 
December 1993 [1994] OJ L/1. On the abortive judicial system provided for in an earlier 
version of the EEA Agreement and which was rejected by the ECJ in Opinion 1/91 (Draft 
Agreement on a European Economic Area) EU:C:1991:490, see below, section 2.3.
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(hereinafter WTO) dispute settlement mechanism, created in 1994, 
can be seen as a real game-changer. Adherence to this system has also 
had important consequences in practice. After having committed itself 
to this compulsory and binding mechanism, the EU has been involved 
in 97 cases as a claimant and 82 cases as a respondent.6 The WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism is by far the most important system of 
compulsory binding third-party settlement in which the EU participates. 
Apart from this system, the EU, in the 1990s, started to accept, and in 
many instances propose, the insertion of arbitration clauses in bilateral 
trade and cooperation agreements and also in some multilateral 
contexts such as the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty.7
The Union’s adherence to the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (hereinafter UNCLOS) in 1998, whilst not coupled with acceptance 
of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea (hereinafter ITLOS), implies inherent acceptance of 
compulsory and binding arbitration, as provided for in Part XV of the 
Convention and its Annex VII.8 In Chile v European Community (the 
Swordfish case), which was ultimately settled out of court, the EU 
and Chile nevertheless submitted the dispute to a chamber of ITLOS.9 
In the Atlanto-Scandian Herring Arbitration, on the other hand, the 
claimant (Denmark, on behalf of the Faroe Islands) initiated arbitration 
proceedings against the EU under the auspices of the Permanent Court 
6 The compulsory and binding WTO system, which covers a broad range of multilateral 
WTO agreements, is regulated in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures concerning 
the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute Settlement Understanding – DSU). The EU concluded 
the 1994 WTO agreements by Council Decision 94/800/EC of 22 December 1994 [1994] 
OJ L336/1. See for statistics on disputes by country, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_
edispu_by_country_e.htm. See also, e.g. A Rosas, ‘Implementation and Enforcement of 
WTO Dispute Settlement Findings: An EU Perspective’ (2001) 4 JIEL 129; F Hoffmeister 
and P Ondrusek, ‘The European Community in International Litigation’ (2008) 61 Rev 
Hellen Dr Intern 205 at 219–22; F Hoffmeister, ‘The European Union and the Peaceful 
Settlement of Disputes’ (2012) 11 Chinese J Intl Law para 5; T Krüger, ‘Shaping the WTO’s 
Institutional Evolution: The EU as a Strategic Litigant in the WTO’ in D Kochenov and F 
Amtenbrink (eds), The European Union’s Shaping of the International Legal Order (CUP 
2014) 169.
7 The Energy Charter Treaty was concluded in 1997, see Council and Commission 
Decision 98/182/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 23 September 1997 [1998] OJ L69/1. See also 
Hoffmeister and Ondrusek (n 6) 223. See more generally on arbitration clauses accepted 
by the EU during the 1990s, Rosas (n 3) 299–308.
8 Council Decision 98/392/EC of 23 March 1998 [1998] OJ L179/1.
9 ITLOS Case No 7. The EU also brought a partly parallel case against Chile before the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism, DS 193 – Chile – Measures Affecting the Transit and 
Importing of Swordfish. Both disputes were discontinued by an Understanding between the 
EU and Chile concerning the conservation of swordfish stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific 
Ocean; see the Agreement on the provisional application of the Understanding, [2010] OJ 
L155/10. See also Rosas (n 3) 301–2; E Paasivirta, ‘The European Union and the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (2015) 38 Fordham Intl L J 1045, 1056–7.
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of Arbitration and thus outside the ITLOS framework.10 This case, too, 
was settled out of court.
Since the 2000s, mainly in the context of bilateral trade negotia-
tions and agreements, the Union has continued and even stepped up 
its support for compulsory and binding arbitration mechanisms. It has 
become almost commonplace to insert arbitration clauses in agreements 
concluded or draft agreements still being negotiated. As is well known, 
however, the compatibility of arbitration mechanisms, especially 
investor–state dispute settlement procedures (hereinafter ISDS), has 
more recently provoked a great deal of debate and controversy. Doubts 
have also been expressed as to their compatibility with the EU legal 
order.11 Moreover, the accession of the EU to the European Convention 
of Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR) has been put on hold by the 
negative opinion of the ECJ on the compatibility of the draft accession 
agreement with the EU legal order.12 These and other more recent 
developments will be addressed in further detail below.
2. Third-party settlement of disputes and the case law 
of the ECJ: six opinions
2.1 introductory observations
The basic treaties, the TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (hereinafter TFEU), contain no provisions that 
explicitly deal with international dispute settlement. Article 218(9) 
TFEU does regulate the establishment of ‘positions to be adopted on 
10 Re Atlantico-Scandian Herring (Denmark in respect of Faroe Islands v EU), PCA Case 
2013-30. See also Paasivirta ibid 1058.
11 Of the already quite extensive literature on this subject suffice it to mention in this 
context SW Schill, ‘Luxembourg Limits: Conditions for Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
under Future EU Investment Agreements’ in M Bungenberg, A Reinisch and C Tietje 
(eds), EU and Investment Agreements: Open Questions and Remaining Challenges (Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschft 2013); C Eckes, ‘International Rulings and the EU Legal Order: Autonomy 
as Legitimacy?’ CLEER Papers 2016/2 (Centre for the Law of EU External Relations) 22–6; 
F Hoffmeister, ‘Of Transferred Competence, Institutional Balance and Judicial Autonomy: 
Constitutional Developments in EU Trade Policy Five Years after Lisbon’ in J Czuczai and F 
Naert (eds), The EU as a Global Actor: Bridging Legal Practice and Theory at the Turn of the 
21st Century – Liber Amicorum Ricardo Gosalbo Bono (Brill – Nijhoff, forthcoming 2017). 
Moreover, a pending request for an Opinion (Opinion 2/15) on a new trade agreement to 
be concluded with Singapore raises the question of competence, in other words whether the 
exclusive competence for direct investment which follows from Article 207 TFEU also covers 
the part of the agreement which establishes an ISDS system covering disputes between 
private investors, on the one hand, and the EU and its Member States, on the other.
12 Opinion 2/13 EU:C:2014:2454.
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the Union’s behalf’ in bodies set up by international agreements when 
these bodies are called upon to ‘adopt acts having legal effects’. That 
this provision, however, is not applicable to international judicial bodies 
has recently been confirmed by the ECJ. The Court noted that Article 
218(9) concerns the positions to be adopted on behalf of the EU in 
the context of its participation ‘in’ the adoption of legal acts and not 
positions expressed by the EU ‘before’ an international court, the latter 
acting independently of the parties (including the EU).13
Instead, some guidance may be gleaned from the provisions 
relating to the EU’s own judicial system and the jurisdiction of the 
CJEU (such as Article 19 TEU and Article 344 TFEU), on the one hand, 
and the need to ensure respect for international law (Articles 3(5) 
and 21(1) TEU referred to above) and the conclusion of international 
agreements (notably Articles 216–219 TFEU), on the other. That said, 
it is ultimately a matter of interpretation as to what extent, and under 
what conditions, the EU may engage in international dispute settlement 
without encroaching upon what is commonly referred to as the autonomy 
of its legal order and the specific characteristics of its judicial system.
This question has come before the ECJ mainly in the form of 
requests, under Article 218(11) TFEU, for an opinion of the Court ‘as 
to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the Treaties’.14 
Before embarking on a more detailed discussion of six such opinions, 
as a preliminary, it should be noted that apart from these opinions, the 
Court has in several judgments dealt with situations that have involved 
in some form or another the use by the EU of third-party dispute 
settlement procedures. These cases, however, did not specifically 
concern the compatibility of such procedures with the EU legal order 
as such but rather addressed questions such as the consequences of the 
use of these procedures for the direct effect of agreements or the non-
contractual liability of the EU15 and the question of the representation 
of the EU before third-party settlement bodies.16
13 Case C-73/14 Council v Commission EU:C:2015:663, paras 62–7.
14 On this procedure in general, see S Adam, La procedure d’avis devant la Cour de 
justice de l’Union européenne (Bruylant 2011). As noted (n 11), a pending request for an 
Opinion on a new trade agreement to be concluded with Singapore raises the question of 
competence rather than compatibility, in other words whether the exclusive competence 
for direct investment which follows from Article 207 TFEU also covers the part of the 
agreement which establishes an ISDS system.
15 Case C-377/02 Van Parys EU:C:2005:121; Joined Cases C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P 
FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission EU:C:2008:476. These two cases concerned 
the WTO dispute settlement system.
16 Case C-73/14 Council v Commission (n 13). This case will be discussed below, 
section 4.1.
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It should be noted that most of the opinions of the ECJ discussed 
below relate to mixed agreements, that is, agreements concluded not 
only by the EU but also by its Member States. As the Member States 
are contracting parties to such agreements, there is a potential for 
disputes not only between the EU and its Member States, on the one 
hand, and a third state, on the other, but also between the Member 
States (intra-EU disputes). Article 344 TFEU, according to which the 
Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of Union law to any other method of 
settlement than those provided for in the treaties, may constitute an 
obstacle to submitting disputes between the Member States to other 
than the ECJ; Opinion 2/13 (accession to the ECHR), which will 
be considered in section 2.6 below, demonstrates that despite the 
existence of Article 344, the potential of intra-EU disputes may raise 
concerns about the compatibility of an agreement envisaged with 
Union law unless the agreement itself explicitly excludes the possibility 
of such disputes.
2.2 opinion 1/76
Whilst the CJEU has not had occasion to rule on all relevant aspects of 
the question of the compatibility of dispute settlement mechanisms with 
the Union legal order, the very idea of third-party settlement has consist-
ently been endorsed by the ECJ. The first pronouncement to this effect 
can be found already in Opinion 1/76 relating to a draft agreement 
establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels, 
in other words at a time when, as noted above, the EU’s approach to 
binding third-party settlement was still one of caution and restraint.17
In this Opinion, the ECJ first, more generally and without specifi-
cally addressing the common judicial organ (Fund Tribunal) provided for 
in the draft agreement, observed that the then Community was not only 
entitled to enter into contractual relations with a third country (in this case 
Switzerland) but also had the power, ‘while observing the provisions of the 
Treaty, to cooperate with that country in setting up an appropriate organism’ 
and in ‘giving the organs of such an institution appropriate powers of 
decision and for the purpose of defining, in a manner appropriate to the 
objectives pursued, the nature, elaboration, implementation and effects of 
the provisions to be adopted within such a framework’.18
17 Opinion 1/76 EU:C:1977:63.
18 ibid para 5.
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Secondly, turning to the issue of the common judicial organ more 
specifically, the Court did not depart from this general statement. It 
did, however, express reservations about the way in which the judicial 
organ was intended to function, including the ambiguity found in the 
draft agreement as to whether the right of national courts to request 
preliminary rulings from the Fund Tribunal was intended to replace, or 
complement, the corresponding powers of the ECJ. With respect to the 
latter interpretation, that is, a situation of complementarity, the Court 
categorically ruled out the possibility, foreseen in the draft agreement, 
of six members of the Court sitting on the Fund Tribunal. For the Court, 
this solution could have compromised their impartiality and duties as 
ECJ judges when questions came up before the ECJ that had already 
been decided by the Fund Tribunal.19
2.3 opinions 1/91 and 1/92
In Opinion 1/91, which concerned the draft agreement establishing the 
EEA, the Court had occasion to elaborate upon the limits which the EU 
legal order imposes for the establishment of third-party mechanisms. 
It found that the envisaged EEA judicial system – consisting of an EEA 
Court and an EEA Court of First Instance and involving judges from 
both the non-EU Contracting Parties and the CJEU – provided for in an 
initial version of the draft agreement posed a threat to the autonomy 
of the Community legal order and was incompatible with the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community.
The Court reached this conclusion, inter alia, because the jurisdic-
tion conferred on the EEA Court to interpret the expression ‘contracting 
party’ in order to determine whether it meant the Community, the 
Community and its Member States or the Member States was likely 
to adversely affect the allocation of responsibilities defined in the 
Community Treaty.20 Moreover, the Court considered that the EEA 
Court, in interpreting the EEA Agreement, could determine not only the 
interpretation of the provisions of that agreement but also the interpre-
tation of the corresponding rules of Community law, given that the EEA 
Agreement took over an essential part of the rules of the Community 
legal order.21 Further, in line with what the Court had said in Opinion 
1/76, it objected to the fact that the draft agreement provided for 
19 ibid paras 17–22.
20 Opinion 1/91 (n 5) paras 31–6. See also, e.g. T Lock, The European Court of Justice and 
International Courts (OUP 2015) 78–80.
21 Opinion 1/91 (n 5) paras 36–46.
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organic links between it and the EEA Court envisaged, as judges of the 
former were supposed to sit in cases dealt with by the latter.22 Finally, 
the draft agreement did not guarantee that the rulings that the ECJ 
could be requested by the EEA Court to give on the interpretation of 
EEA provisions which were identical to Community rules were legally 
binding.23
Despite the negative conclusion reached with respect to the 
judicial system provided for in the initial EEA draft agreement, the Court 
stated at a general level that an international agreement providing for 
its own system of courts, including a court with jurisdiction to settle 
disputes between the contracting parties (and thus between the EU and 
third states party to the agreement), ‘is in principle compatible with 
Community law’.24
Indeed a year later, in Opinion 1/92, the ECJ accepted a new 
version of the EEA Agreement, inter alia, because there were sufficient 
guarantees to ensure that the new EFTA Court, now clearly separated 
from the CJEU, could not, by interpreting the EEA Agreement, determine 
the interpretation of identical Community rules, and that the EEA Joint 
Committee could not disregard rulings of the CJEU.25 Moreover, the 
ECJ did not find a problem of compatibility with the Community legal 
order of the arbitration procedure provided for in the new version of 
the EEA Agreement. For the Court, it was sufficient to observe that this 
mechanism could not interpret the provisions of the EEA Agreement 
that were identical to provisions of Community law.26
2.4 opinion 1/00
Somewhat similar but not identical questions arose in Opinion 1/00 
relating to a proposed agreement between the then-Community and 
certain non-Member States on the establishment of a European Common 
Aviation Area.27 In concluding that this draft agreement did not affect 
the autonomy of, and was thus compatible with, the EU legal order, the 
ECJ found (1) that it did not alter the ‘essential character of the powers 
22 ibid paras 47–53.
23 ibid paras 54–65.
24 ibid paras 39–40, 70 (quotation from para 40).
25 Opinion 1/92 EU:C:1992:189, paras 17–35. These differences between the first and 
the second versions of the EEA Agreement were also underlined in Opinion 1/00 relating 
to a proposed agreement between the then Community and non-Member States on the 
establishment of a common aviation area, EU:C:2002:231, para 6.
26 Opinion 1/92 (n 25) para 36.
27 Opinion 1/00 (n 25).
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of the Community and its institutions’ nor did it (2), in the context of 
the need to ensure uniform interpretation, have the effect of ‘binding 
the Community and its institutions, in the exercise of their internal 
powers, to a particular interpretation of the rules of Community law 
referred to in that agreement’ (paras 12–13).
As to the first requirement, the agreement would not affect the 
allocation of powers between the Community and its Member States, 
since it was conceived as a Community-only agreement which did not 
involve the direct participation of the Member States. Moreover, the 
agreement would not affect the essential character of the powers of 
the Commission and the Court, as the latter would have preserved its 
exclusive task of reviewing the legality of Community acts, and its rulings, 
also in the context of the aviation area, would always have been binding.28
As to the second requirement, the Court noted the various 
safeguards provided for in the proposed agreement to ensure that 
any of its provisions that were identical in substance to provisions of 
Community law be interpreted in conformity with Community law, 
including decisions of the Commission and rulings of the CJEU. In 
particular, the decisions of the Joint Committee, when acting as a 
dispute settlement body, would not affect the case law of the Court 
and the requirement of unanimity would ensure that the Community’s 
representatives on the Joint Committee could block decisions that 
would conflict with Community law.29
2.5 opinion 1/09
As can be deduced from the discussion above, the ECJ has paid consid-
erable attention to the content and nature of the rules contained 
in the respective agreement envisaged and has asserted that if these 
rules are in ‘substance identical’ to the corresponding rules of EU law, 
care should be taken to avoid that the interpretations arrived at with 
regard to the rules of the agreement determine the interpretation of the 
internal Union rules. In the context of Opinion 1/09 relating to a draft 
agreement on the creation of a unified patent litigation system, the 
Court was faced with a system that would have gone further in entailing 
the direct application of Union rules by an international court.30 
Moreover, this patent court would have replaced the national courts 
28 ibid paras 14–26.
29 ibid paras 27–45.
30 Opinion 1/09 EU:C:2011:123.
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of the EU Member States and deprived them of their right to request 
preliminary rulings from the ECJ under Article 267 TFEU.
Given the primordial importance of national courts for the EU 
judicial system,31 it should have come as no surprise that the ECJ found 
the draft agreement incompatible with the Union legal order. The Court 
did, however, recall its earlier dicta to the effect that mechanisms for 
third-party dispute settlement in international agreements concluded 
by the EU are not, in principle, incompatible with Union law32 and that 
an international agreement may even affect the powers of the Court 
itself provided that there are guarantees safeguarding the essential 
character of those powers.33
2.6 opinion 2/13
In its fairly recent Opinion 2/13, the ECJ famously (for some, 
infamously) concluded that a draft agreement designed to implement 
the first sentence of Article 6(2) TEU (‘The Union shall accede to 
the [ECHR]’) and Protocol No 8 relating to Article 6(2) TEU was not 
compatible with Union law.34 For brevity, it is not possible here to enter 
into a detailed discussion of Opinion 2/13, given the complexity and 
particular nature of the constitutional issues involved and the number 
of problems the Court saw in the draft agreement as it resulted from 
negotiations between the Commission, on the one hand, and the 47 
Member States of the Council of Europe, on the other. What follows are 
four brief observations that seem particularly relevant in the context of 
international third-party dispute settlement and its compatibility with 
the Union legal order.
First, in its Opinion the ECJ reaffirmed its earlier dicta to the effect 
that acceptance of third-party dispute settlement is not, in principle, 
incompatible with EU law and that the decisions of international courts 
may become binding on the Union, including the ECJ. On the other 
31 A Rosas, ‘The National Judge as EU Judge: Opinion 1/09’ in P Cardonnel, A Rosas 
and N Wahl (eds), Constitutionalising the EU Judicial System: Essays in Honour of Pernilla 
Lindh (Hart Publishing 2012) 105; A Rosas, ‘The National Judge as EU Judge: Some 
Constitutional Observations’ (2014) 67 SMU L Rev 717.
32 Opinion 1/09 (n 30) para 74. The Court here referred to Opinion 1/91 (n 5).
33 Opinion 1/09 (30) para 76. The Court here referred to Opinion 1/00 (n 25).
34 Opinion 2/13 (n 12). There is an abundance of legal writings on Opinion 2/13. Suffice 
it to mention here D Halberstam, ‘“It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!” A Modest Defense of Opinion 
2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR, and the Way Forward’ (2015) 432 Public Law and Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series, Michigan Law, University of Michigan; P Eeckhout, ‘Opinion 
2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue: Autonomy or Autarky?’ (2015) 
38 Fordham Intl L J 955.
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hand, the powers of the ECJ may not in such a case be affected if the 
‘essential character of those powers’ is not safeguarded.35
Secondly, it should be noted that there is a close link between 
the ECHR and Union law concerning fundamental rights, in particular 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. It is in fact stated in Article 
52(3) of the Charter that in so far as the Charter contains rights which 
‘correspond to’ rights guaranteed by the ECHR, ‘the meaning and 
scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said 
Convention’. Moreover, accession to the ECHR would make the ECHR 
itself an integral part of Union law. Many of the more specific problems 
the ECJ saw in the draft accession agreement has to be seen against this 
background, and the Opinion, in line with previous case law, observed 
that any action by the ECHR bodies should not have the effect of binding 
the EU and its institutions, ‘in the exercise of their internal powers’ to a 
particular interpretation of the rules of EU law, including the Charter.36 
In this context, the Court mentioned three specific problems, of which 
the most important one seems to be the risk that, without appropriate 
safeguards in the accession agreement, the ECHR case law could 
interfere with the obligation of Member States, by virtue of the principle 
of mutual recognition, to presume that fundamental rights have been 
observed by the other Member States.37
Thirdly, the question of mutual recognition is a specific example 
of a more general concern expressed by the ECJ, namely that the draft 
accession agreement failed to adequately address the fact that the EU is 
not a state like the other contracting parties, including its own Member 
States, but constitutes a distinct supranational order which prevails over 
the law of its Member States. As the ECHR would require the EU and 
its Member States to be considered contracting parties not only in their 
relations with third states but also in their relations with each other, the 
Convention could, contrary to Union law relating to mutual recognition 
and mutual trust, require that a Member State check that another 
Member State has observed fundamental rights to an extent which 
35 Opinion 2/13 (n 12) paras 182–3.
36 ibid paras 184–6 (citation from para 184).
37 ibid paras 191–5. The two other problems mentioned were the need to clarify the 
relationship between Article 53 of the ECHR and Article 53 of the Charter (both are ‘without 
prejudice’ clauses relating to other human rights obligations than those contained in the 
two respective instruments) and Protocol No 16 to the ECHR which may give national 
courts of EU Member States the right to submit preliminary rulings requests to the ECHR 
and thus provides for a kind of alternative preliminary ruling procedure, as compared with 
Article 267 TFEU (which is a ‘keystone’ of the EU judicial system, ibid para 176), ibid paras 
187–90 and 196–9, respectively.
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would go beyond what is permissible under Union law.38 In fact, all but 
one of the other problems the Court saw in the draft agreement stem 
from the fact that under the accession arrangements as envisaged, the 
Member States would remain contracting parties alongside the Union 
itself. These other problems relate to the allocation of powers between 
the Union and the Member States and according to the Court, sufficient 
safeguards were not provided for to exclude the possibility that ECHR 
bodies could determine, for instance, the allocation of powers between 
the Union and its Member States.39
Fourthly, the only question raised in Opinion 2/13 that did not 
appear to stem specifically – or at least not exclusively – from the 
participation of the EU Member States in the ECHR system concerns the 
powers of the European Court of Human Rights to review the compat-
ibility of EU common foreign and security policy (hereinafter CFSP) 
matters with the ECHR notwithstanding the fact that the jurisdiction 
of the CJEU over at least ‘certain’ acts adopted within the CFSP context 
is excluded.40 Citing Opinion 1/09, the ECJ observed that such powers 
‘cannot be conferred exclusively on an international court which is 
outside the institutional and judicial framework of the EU’.41
3. Recent developments
3.1 state-to-state arbitration
As noted above, the 1990s saw an increased emphasis on third-party 
dispute settlement mechanisms, notably compulsory and binding 
arbitration, in the treaty-making policies of the EU. This trend is even 
more apparent in the 2000s, when so-called state-to-state arbitration 
clauses started to pop up almost systematically in bilateral trade and 
38 ibid e.g. paras 155–8, 192–4. For a recent judgment concerning the right and 
obligation of the sending Member State to verify that the transfer of a person not interfere 
with his rights under Article 4 (inhuman and degrading treatment) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights see, e.g. Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 Aranyosi and Caldararu 
EU:C:2016:198.
39 Opinion 2/13 (n 12) paras 201–14 (on Article 344 TFEU, which excludes litigation 
between the Member States on matters of EU law), 215–34 (co-respondent mechanism) and 
236–48 (so-called prior involvement of the ECJ on matters pertaining to EU law referred to 
the European Court of Human Rights on which the ECJ has not previously ruled).
40 See ibid para 252. The borderline between ‘pure’ CFSP matters excluded from the CJEU’s 
jurisdiction and other matters is open to interpretation, however; see, e.g. Case C-439/13 
P Elitaliana v Eulex Kosovo EU:C:2015:753; Case C-455/14 P H v Council, Commission and 
European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina EU:C:2016:569.
41 Opinion 2/13 (n 12) para 256. On Opinion 1/09 (n 30), see section 2.5 above.
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cooperation agreements concluded by the EU, in most cases together 
with its Member States, of the one part, and a third state, of the other 
part. It is true that so far, there does not seem to be a single case where 
these arbitration mechanisms have been actually used in practice. Thus, 
as far as the EU is concerned, the case law on trade and trade-related 
matters continues to emanate more or less exclusively from the WTO 
dispute settlement system. On the other hand, most of the arbitration rules 
in question have only been in force for a short time or are not yet in force 
and, in any case, such rules may be of some importance even if disagree-
ments do not actually lead to the establishment of an arbitration panel.42
As many of the agreements regulate dispute settlement mechanisms, 
and arbitration in particular, in quite some detail, including possible 
annexes on rules of procedure and codes of conduct for members of 
arbitration panels, it is not possible here to provide an in-depth analysis 
of all the agreements and the differences that exist between them.43 
However, some general trends, starting with state-to-state arbitration 
mechanisms concluded by the EU, deserve particular mention.
As to agreements concluded by the EU with European countries, 
the agreements concluded from 2010 onwards with Balkan countries 
contain, as far as some of their trade and commercial provisions 
are concerned, clauses on compulsory and binding state-to-state 
arbitration, with fairly detailed rules on procedures and compliance. 
The arbitration panel is to be composed of three arbitrators, who, in 
the event that the parties are unable to agree, are to be selected by lot 
from lists established in advance.44 Arguably to take into account the 
case law of the ECJ referred to above (the six Opinions), the arbitration 
42 Hoffmeister (n 11) mentions that the Commission in one instance considered the 
possibility of triggering the mediation mechanism under Chapter 14 of the EU–Korea free 
trade agreement (on this agreement see below at n 54) but this was not pursued after an 
amicable settlement had been reached.
43 Some comparisons between dispute settlement procedures under regional trade 
agreements worldwide (and thus not limited to agreements concluded by the EU) can 
be found in the WTO document ‘Mapping of Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Regional 
Trade Agreements – Innovative or Variations on a Theme?’, Staff Working Paper ERSD-
2013/07 of 10 June 2013.
44 Stabilisation and Association Agreements with Montenegro, Council and Commission 
Decision 2010/224/EU, Euratom of 29 March 2010 [2010] OJ L108/1, Article 130(4) 
and Protocol No 7; Serbia, Council and Commission Decision 2013/490/EU of 22 July 
2013 [2013] OJ L278/1, Article 130(4) and Protocol No 7; Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Council and Commission Decision (EU, Euratom) 2015/998 of 21 April 2015 [2015] OJ 
L164/548, Article 126(4) and Protocol No 6; Kosovo, Article 137(4) and Protocol No 5. 
Compare the Stabilisation and Association Agreements concluded with Macedonia, Council 
and Commission Decision 2044/239/EC, Euratom of 23 February 2004 [2004] OJ L84/1, 
Article 111; Albania, Council and Commission Decision 2009/332/EC, Euratom of 26 
February 2009 [2009] OJ L107/165, Article 119, which provide for the submission of 
disputes to the joint Stabilisation and Association Council.
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panels are instructed to apply and interpret the respective agreement 
in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public interna-
tional law while they are prohibited from interpreting the EU acquis or 
from giving decisive weight to the fact that a provision in the agreement 
is ‘identical in substance’ to an (internal) EU law provision.45
To take a recent example of an agreement with Eastern European 
countries, the association agreement concluded with Ukraine contains 
arbitration provisions similar to the one to be found in the above Balkan 
agreements but with some modifications, such as rules of interpreta-
tion instructing the arbitration panel, where an obligation under the 
agreement is identical with an WTO obligation, to adopt an interpreta-
tion which is consistent with interpretations established in rulings of the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body.46 Moreover, this agreement also contains 
provisions on conciliation (concerning urgent energy disputes), mediation 
(on certain trade matters) and submission of disputes other than trade and 
trade-related matters to the joint Association Council.47 Arguably again 
to avoid problems of compatibility with EU law as raised by the ECJ, 
the agreement provides that in the event of regulatory approximation 
by reference to provisions of EU law, such disputes raising a question of 
interpretation of EU law shall not be decided by an arbitration panel but 
the panel shall instead request that the CJEU give a ruling. This provision 
was considered necessary in view of the close links between EU single 
market law and the agreement, which, in providing market access to the 
EU’s market, is based on the idea of regulatory approximation.48
The association agreements with some Mediterranean countries 
form another group of agreements involving third-party settlement 
for the settlement of trade disputes. While the principal agreements 
contain a brief clause on submitting any disputes to the joint Association 
Council, and in the event of the Council not being able to settle the 
dispute via arbitration, the Commission in 2006 was authorized to 
negotiate additional instruments specifically dealing with the settlement 
of trade disputes. These instruments, which in most cases take the form 
of protocols, contain fairly detailed rules on mediation and arbitration. 
45 See, e.g. Article 13 of Protocol No 6 to the agreement concluded with Kosovo (n 44).
46 Council Decision 2014/295/EU of 17 March 2014 on the signing and partial 
provisional application of the Ukraine Association Agreement [2014] OJ L161/1, notably 
Articles 306–13, 318–26. See also the agreements with Georgia and Moldova, [2014] OJ 
L261/4 and L260/4, respectively.
47 See notably Articles 309, 327–36, 477. See also Article 301 on the use of a group of 
experts to recommend solutions in matters of trade and sustainable development.
48 Article 322. See E Paasivirta, ‘European Union and Dispute Settlement: Managing 
Proliferation and Fragmentation’ in M Cremona, A Thies and RA Wessel (eds), The European 
Union and International Dispute Settlement (Hart Publishing, forthcoming 2017).
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In the case of the latter, both the arbitration procedure and the 
provisions on compliance are similar if not identical to the ones to be 
found in European agreements discussed above and are supplemented 
by annexes on Rules of Procedure and Code of Conduct for arbitrators 
and mediators.49 Arbitration panels are instructed to interpret the trade 
provisions in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law.50 Express wording that the panel is precluded 
from interpreting (internal) EU law is not included but has apparently 
been considered inherent in the nature of the association agreements.
In the same vein, agreements with some Latin American countries 
contain, with respect to trade and trade-related parts of the respective 
agreement, rules primarily on arbitration. While they are not very 
different from the arbitration procedures described above, they are 
somewhat more heterogenous;51 at least one agreement instructs the 
arbitration panel not only to interpret the agreement in accordance with 
customary rules of public international law but also, where provision of 
the trade part is identical to a WTO provision, to adopt an interpretation 
that is consistent with interpretations established by the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body.52 The dispute settlement provisions, and arbitration 
rules in particular, contained in recent agreements concluded or about 
to be concluded with different groups of African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries (partly replacing the Cotonou Agreement of 2000), form 
a somewhat more homogenous category but follow by and large the 
general pattern described above.53
Additionally, the dispute settlement provisions of the Free Trade 
Agreement with the Republic of Korea, which entered into force in 
2015, provide for third-party settlement mechanisms and arbitration in 
49 Protocols with Tunisia, [2010] OJ L40/76; Lebanon, [2010] OJ L328/21; Egypt, 
[2011] OJ L138/3; Jordan, [2011] OJ L177/3; Agreement with Morocco, [2011] OJ 
L176/1. See also Articles 61–80 of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Iraq, 
[2012] OJ L204/20.
50 Article 17 in each instrument.
51 Decision No 2/2001 of the EU–Mexico Joint Council of 27 February 2001 
implementing, inter alia, Article 50 (dispute settlement) of the Economic Partnership, 
Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement, [2001] OJ L70/7, Articles 37–43; 
Association Agreement with Chile, [2002] OJ L352/3, Articles 181–9; Association 
Agreement with Central America, [2012] OJ L346/1, Articles 308–37 (containing also 
detailed rules on mediation for non-tariff measures); Trade Agreement with Colombia and 
Peru, [2012] OJ L354/1, Articles 298–323.
52 Article 322(2) of the Association Agreement with Central America (n 51).
53 Economic Partnership Agreements with CARIFORUM States, [2008] OJ L289/3, 
Articles 202–23; SADC EPA States, [2016] OJ L250/3, Articles 75–96; Interim Agreements 
with the Pacific States, [2009] OJ L272/1, Articles 47–67; Central African Party 
(Cameroon), [2009] OJ L57/2, Articles 66–88; Commission Proposals for Economic 
Partnership Agreements with West African, ECOWAS and the UEMOA, COM(2014) 576
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particular, with respect to any dispute between the parties concerning 
the application of the agreement.54 The arbitration rules are broadly 
similar to the general pattern. In line with what is provided for in the 
agreements with Ukraine and Central America mentioned above, the 
Korean agreement instructs the three-member arbitration panel to adopt, 
in the event of an obligation under the agreement being ‘identical’ to a 
WTO obligation, an interpretation ‘which is consistent’ with any relevant 
interpretation established by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.55
While the above arbitration mechanisms have been provided for 
in bilateral agreements, and have in most cases been limited to trade 
and trade-related matters, the EU may also become party to disputes 
under third-party settlement mechanisms to be found in multilateral 
agreements as well as non-trade bilateral agreements. The WTO, 
Energy Charter Treaty and UNCLOS dispute settlement regimes have 
already been referred to above. While it is not possible here to provide 
a comprehensive picture of other, more recent agreements, it should 
be mentioned that the Air Transport Agreement, signed by the EU and 
its Member States, of the one part, and the USA, of the other part, in 
2007, provides an example of a bilateral arbitration procedure. This 
‘Open Skies’ Agreement provides for the possibility of submitting to 
compulsory arbitration disputes which have not been settled by the 
Joint Committee set up under the agreement.56 At the time of writing, 
the European Commission has decided to submit a dispute concerning 
the access of Norwegian Air to the US market to arbitration.57
final, Articles 62–86; East African Community Partner States, COM(2016) 64 final, Articles 
109–27. Whilst these agreements, in line with the general pattern, provide, in the case of 
disagreement, for the selection of arbitrators by lot, the Interim Agreement with Eastern 
and Southern Africa States, which contains a much more succinct arbitration clause, 
provides that in case of disagreement the arbitrator(s) shall be appointed by the Secretary 
General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, [2012] OJ L111/2, Article 55.
54 Council Decision 2011/265/EU of 16 September 2010 on the signing and provisional 
application of the agreement, [2011] OJ L127/1, Articles 14.1–14.20. The full agreement 
entered into force in December 2015, [2015] OJ L307/1. See also Decision No 2 of the EU–
Korea Trade Committee of 23 December 2011 on the establishment of a list of arbitrators, 
[2011] OJ L58/13 (as with most other agreements, there are 15 persons on the list as 
potential arbitrators, five each proposed by the two parties and five agreed as potential 
chairpersons).
55 ibid Article 14.16.
56 See Article 19 of the Air Transport Agreement between the European [Union] and its 
Member States, on the one hand, and the USA, on the other hand, [2007] OJ L134/4, which 
contains some basic provisions concerning the composition (as a rule, three arbitrators) of 
the tribunal, procedures and enforcement but leaving considerable room for the parties to 
agree otherwise.
57 Letter from Commissioner Violeta Bulc to Transport Secretary Anthony Foxx of 22 July 
2016, JS/ARES(016) 3906721. J Posaner, ‘Norwegian Airline Clouds Open Skies’, Politico 31 
August 2016 http://www.politico.eu/article/n o r w e g i a n - a i r l i n e - n a i - i r e l a n d - u s - o p en-skies.
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3.2 investor-to-state arbitration
While state-to-state arbitration and judicial settlement constitute well-
established third-party mechanisms to settle disputes under public 
international law, it is more exceptional that private parties are given 
standing as parties before such bodies. Apart from some regional 
human rights courts such as the European Court of Human Rights (to 
which the EU is not a contracting party), one such instance is the right, 
provided for in numerous bilateral investment treaties (hereinafter 
BITs) and some other agreements dealing with investment protection, 
of private investors to initiate arbitration procedures against a state 
that has allegedly violated the agreement in question.58 Such ISDS 
procedures may also be grounded in contracts and the applicable law is 
not necessarily confined to public international law.59
While ISDS mechanisms began to have practical importance already 
in the 1960s, and came to concern also the EU as the Union concluded the 
Energy Charter Treaty in 1994, and while a considerable number of BITs 
providing for ISDS have been concluded by EU Member States, this form 
of dispute settlement has only recently become an important issue for the 
Union as such.60 This development should be seen against the background 
that the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007, which entered into force in 2009, 
added ‘foreign direct investment’ to the provision of the TFEU (Article 
207) which deals with the common commercial policy, an area in which, 
according to Article 3(1) TFEU, the Union has exclusive competence.61
In 2010, the European Commission issued a Communication 
advocating the use of ISDS and on the proposal of the Commission, 
58 According to M Bungenberg et al, ‘Chapter I: General Introduction to International 
Investment Law’ in M Bungenberg et al (eds), International Investment Law: A Handbook 
(Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2015) 1, there are ‘by now 3,200 bi- and multilateral investment 
treaties as well as free trade agreements which have investment chapters’ (at 1) while ‘the 
total number of arbitrations based on investment treaties has exceeded 600’ (at 4).
59 ibid 2, 5.
60 See, e.g. Bungenberg, Reinisch and Tietje (n 11), notably articles by C Brown and I 
Naglis (at 17) and F Hoffmeister and G Ünüvar (57, 75–80); Bungenberg et al (n 58), notably 
contributions by J Griebel (at 304), M Bungenberg and S Hobe (1602) and A Reinisch (1884); 
M Burkstaller, ‘Investor–State Arbitration in EU International Investment Agreements with 
Third States’ (2012) 39 LIEI 207; A Reinisch, ‘The European Union and Investor–State Dispute 
Settlement: From Investor–State Arbitration to a Permanent Investment Court’, Centre for 
International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Investor–State Arbitration Series, Paper No 2 
(March 2016).
61 These developments have also called into question the legality of the existing 
BITs concluded by EU Member States with third countries and in some cases, Member 
States have been condemned for maintaining provisions in such agreements found to 
be incompatible with Union law, Cases C-205/06 Commission v Austria EU:C:2009:118; 
C-249/06 Commission v Sweden EU:C:2009:119; Commission v Finland EU:C:2009:715. 
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the European Parliament and the Council in 2014 adopted a regulation 
establishing a framework for managing financial responsibility and the 
allocation of responsibilities for the conduct of disputes between the Union 
and its Member States.62 In line with these developments, the Commission 
has pursued the inclusion of a chapter on investment, including ISDS 
mechanisms, in new trade agreements negotiated with Canada, India, 
Japan, Singapore, Vietnam and the USA. The agreement with Canada 
(Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement – hereinafter CETA) 
has already advanced to Council decisions on signature and provisional 
application.63 As there is disagreement between the Council and the 
Commission as to whether the agreement with Singapore should be 
a Union only or a mixed agreement, the draft agreement, as far as 
the question of competence (exclusive or not) is concerned, has been 
submitted by the Commission to the ECJ for an Opinion.64
As the Commission accepted that CETA be concluded as a mixed 
agreement, it was so decided and thus its conclusion requires the 
separate participation of the Member States (and for Belgium, also 
its regions and communities). This requirement already affected the 
signature and provisional application of the agreement, which could 
only be secured after the German Constitutional Court had rejected 
a request for provisional measures to bar German participation,65 the 
Walloon region, after difficult negotiations, had given a conditional 
consent to Belgian participation and a joint interpretative instrument 
A Regulation of 2012 has introduced some transitional arrangements which provide that 
Member States may, under certain conditions, be authorized to maintain, and even to 
conclude, investment agreements; see below (n 97). On the common commercial policy 
as an exclusive competence see, generally, A Rosas, ‘EU External Relations: Exclusive 
Competence Revisited’ (2015) 38 Fordham Intl L J 1073, 1079–83.
62 Communication from the Commission, COM(2010) 343 final ‘Towards a 
Comprehensive European International Investment Policy’; Regulation (EU) No 912/2014 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014, [2014] OJ L257/121.
63 See the Commission proposals COM(2016) 470 final of 5 July 2016; COM(2016) 443 
final of 5 July 2016. Signature took place on 30 October 2016. On the Canada Agreement 
more generally, see, e.g. C Deblock, J Lebullenger and S Paquin (eds), Un nouveau point sur 
l’Atlantique. L’accord économique et commercial global entre l’Union européenne et le Canada 
(Presses de l’Université du Québec 2015).
64 Opinion 2/15. The oral hearing took place on 12–13 September 2016. The request for 
an Opinion is limited to the question of competence (should the agreement be concluded 
by the Union alone or also by the Member States?) and in the context of this Opinion, one 
of the issues is whether the Union exclusive competence under Article 207 TFEU covers 
also the part of the investment chapter establishing an ISDS mechanism. See also above 
(n 11 and n 14).
65 On 13 October, the German Constitutional Court rejected a request for provisional 
measures which would have prevented the German representatives in the EU Council from 
voting in favour of a Council decision on the signature and provisional application of the 
Agreement, judgment of 13 October 2016, 2 BvE 3/16.
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and a number of statements had been added to accompany signature 
and provisional application.66
As a response to the public criticism of ISDS mechanisms, inter 
alia, for lack of sufficient guarantees of impartiality and transparency, 
the Commission, in 2014–15, launched the idea of a more permanent 
mechanism with sufficient guarantees, including the possibility of 
appeal.67 Whilst the draft Singapore agreement is based on a more 
classic arbitration mechanism, CETA now envisages the creation of 
a permanent investment tribunal, with a possibility for appeal to an 
appellate tribunal,68 a solution also proposed by the Commission for 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (hereinafter TTIP) 
negotiated with the USA.69
Without going into the details concerning the constitution and 
functioning of the tribunal and the appellate tribunal, it should be noted 
that CETA envisages a tribunal consisting of 15 members appointed by the 
CETA Joint Committee (and thus the investors who submit claims would 
be excluded) for five- or six-year terms. Whilst the tribunal would not have 
exclusive jurisdiction, an investor could only submit a claim if any existing 
proceedings before domestic or international courts are withdrawn or 
discontinued and a right to initiate new such proceedings waived.
Various provisions have been designed with the obvious intent of 
avoiding the problems raised in the ECJ Opinions referred to in section 2 
above. The tribunal would thus be required to apply and interpret the 
agreement in accordance with international law, would not have 
jurisdiction to determine the legality of a measure under domestic law 
(including Union law) and would be instructed to follow the prevailing 
interpretation given to domestic law by the relevant domestic courts 
while any meaning given to domestic law by the tribunal would not 
be binding on a domestic court (including the CJEU). Moreover, an 
investor who intends to initiate a claim against the EU or a Member 
66 See, e.g. Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), ‘CETA’s Signature: 38 Statements, 
a Joint Interpretative Instrument and an Uncertain Future’, 31 October 2016 www.cepts.
eu/publications, consulted on 4 November 2016.
67  See, e.g. Commission Concept Paper of 7 May 2015 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF.
68 See Section F of the investment part (Articles 8.18 and following) of the Agreement.
69 See e.g. L Pantaleo, W Douma and T Takács (eds), ‘Tiptoeing to TTIP: What Kind of 
Agreement for What Kind of Partnership?’, CLEER Papers 1/2016 (Centre for the Law of 
EU External Relations 2016); European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration 
(EFILA), Task Force Paper regarding the proposed International Court System (ICS) 
(Brussels 2016); Inge Govaere, ‘TTIP and Dispute Settlement: Potential Consequences 
for the Autonomous EU Legal Order’, College of Europe, Department of European Legal 
Studies, Research Paper 01/2016.
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State must first deliver a notice requesting a determination by the 
EU of the proper respondent. It should be mentioned that the latter 
requirement is also expressed in a Statement that the then–European 
Community submitted to the Energy Charter Secretariat inviting 
investors wishing to initiate investor-to-state proceedings under the 
Energy Charter Treaty to seek clarification from the Community and its 
Member States as to who among them should be the proper respondent 
party.70 It remains to be seen whether these safeguards are sufficient 
to exclude the problems dealt with in the earlier Opinions of the Court, 
such as the risk that an international body could at least indirectly take 
a position on the allocation of competence between the Union and its 
Member States.
As is well known, the debate about the political feasibility as 
well as the compatibility of ISDS mechanisms with the EU legal order 
continues and the possibility of an investment court system has not put 
the question to rest.71 The Council decision on provisional application 
of CETA excludes its ISDS mechanism from provisional application 
and this mechanism will only enter into force if CETA will be finally 
concluded by the Union and ratified by the Member States.72 Instead, 
whilst at the time of writing, the European Parliament has rejected a 
proposal to request an Opinion from the ECJ, Belgium, at the insistence 
of the Walloon region, will probably be requesting the Court to give 
an Opinion on the compatibility of the CETA ISDS mechanism with 
the Treaties. And as noted above, the ISDS mechanism provided for 
in the agreement with Singapore is already, in terms of competence, 
considered in Opinion 2/15 pending before the Court.
4. Issues of representation, responsibility and competence
4.1 agreements concluded by the eU
The above discussion has concerned the involvement of the EU in inter-
national dispute settlement procedures in its capacity of a subject of 
70 See, e.g. Schill (n 11) 49–50.
71 Schill (n 11) 54, seems to think that ad hoc arbitration tribunals pose less of a risk 
than permanent courts for the autonomy of the EU legal order as permanent bodies tend to 
pursue ‘an institutionally backed power strategy that could be in opposition to the CJEU’s 
role as the EU’s constitutional court’. See also Govaere (n 69) 7 (‘opting for a public Court 
system instead of private arbitration is not, in itself, a guarantee of compatibility with the 
autonomous EU legal order’); Eckes (n 11) 26–31.
72 For the text of the Council decision see Council document 10974/16 of 5 October 2016.
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international law, without considering the question of which organ of 
the Union should represent it before dispute settlement bodies or what 
is the role, if any, of EU Member States in this regard. To start with the 
question of representation, it has, at times, been a source of controversy 
between the Commission and the Council, the latter insisting that 
the EU position to be presented before dispute settlement bodies be 
approved by the Council, in a way comparable to the conclusion of 
international agreements.
The ECJ has in its earlier case law touched upon some aspects 
of this question without having had to face the problem head on. First 
of all, the Court, faced with a challenge to the Commission’s right to 
commence legal proceedings before a national court of a third state, 
held that Article 335 TFEU (ex-Article 282 TEC), which provides that 
in each of the Member States, the Union may, inter alia, be a party to 
legal proceedings and be ‘[t]o this end’ represented by the Commission, 
is, despite being restricted to Member States on its wording, ‘the 
expression of a general principle’.73 Second, the Court, in the context 
of an infringement case brought against a Member State, observed that 
the Commission ‘is responsible for ensuring application of the Treaty 
and, accordingly, compliance with international agreements concluded 
by the Community’.74 Third, with respect to the Commission’s duty to 
ensure the correct implementation of an international agreement in 
relation to third states (in that case the Association Agreement with 
Turkey), the Court has observed that ‘it follows from Article [17 TEU] 
that the Commission, as guardian of the [TFEU] and the agreements 
concluded under it, must ensure the correct implementation by a third 
country of the obligations it has assumed under an agreement concluded 
with the [Union], using the means provided for by the agreement or by 
the decisions taken pursuant thereto’.75
Fourthly, and more recently, the Court held that the Commission 
could, without obtaining the prior approval of the Council, submit a 
written statement on behalf of the EU to the ITLOS on the request for 
an advisory opinion made by a sub-regional fisheries commission.76 
73 Case C-131/03 Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission EU:C:2006:541, para 94.
74 Case C-61/94 Commission v Germany EU:C:1996:313, para 15.
75 Case C-204/07 PCAS v Commission EU:C:2008:446, para 95. See also Joined Cases 
T-186/97 et al Kaufring AG and Others v Commission EU:T:2001:133, paras 270–1, in which 
the then Court of First Instance (now the General Court) held that the Commission has 
a duty to ensure the correct implementation by a third country of the obligations it has 
contracted to fulfil under an agreement concluded by the Union, ‘using the means provided 
for by the agreement or by the decisions taken pursuant to it’. See also Rosas (n 3) 317–20.
76 Case C-73/14 Council v Commission  (n 13). See also Paasivirta (n 9) 1058–60, who 
describes the relevant advisory opinion case before ITLOS (Case No 21) and (n 91) below.
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Whilst the Council and the Member States argued that Article 335 TFEU 
concerns proceedings before national courts only, the Court repeated 
its earlier statement that this provision, despite its wording, expresses 
a general principle and that it provides a basis for the Commission to 
represent the Union before ITLOS.
As to the argument that the matter was covered by Article 218(9) 
TFEU concerning positions to be adopted on the Union’s behalf in 
bodies set up by international agreements (which requires a decision 
of the Council), the Court held that this procedure was not applicable 
to the determination of a position to be expressed on behalf of the 
Union before an international judicial body requested to give an 
advisory opinion, ‘the adoption of which falls solely within the remit 
and responsibility of the members of that body, acting, to that end, 
wholly independently of the parties’.77 As regards, finally, the argument 
that the Commission was prevented from doing what it did because 
of Article 16(1) TEU, which refers to the task of the Council to ‘carry 
out policy-making … functions as laid down in the Treaties’, the Court 
considered that the purpose of the statement submitted to the tribunal 
‘was … not to formulate a policy’ in relation to fishing, but, on the basis 
of an analysis of the relevant provisions of international and EU law, to 
present ‘a set of legal observations’ aimed at enabling the tribunal to 
give an informed advisory opinion on the questions put to it.78
In the light of this judgment, and the earlier case law referred to 
above, it would seem that Article 218 TFEU is about norm-creation, be 
it in the form of concluding international agreements or establishing 
a Union position on decisions to be taken by international bodies, 
not about the interpretation and application of existing norms.79 The 
latter function is part of the Commission’s prerogatives, as stated in 
Article 17(1) TEU (the Commission ‘shall ensure the application of 
the Treaties, and of measures adopted by the institutions pursuant to 
them’, ‘shall oversee the application of Union law under the control of 
the Court of Justice’ and shall, as a general rule, ‘ensure the Union’s 
external representation’) and Article 335 TFEU. Actual practice seems 
generally to be in line with this approach, as it is the Commission that 
represents the EU for example before the WTO dispute settlement 
77 Case C-73/14 (n 13) para 66.
78 ibid para 71.
79 In ibid para 70, the Court observed that the Commission statement ‘consisted in 
suggesting answers to the questions raised … by setting out the manner in which the 
[EU] envisaged the interpretation and application’ of three agreements relating to fishing, 
including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
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mechanism and also before other dispute settlement bodies such as 
ITLOS.80 It is, on the other hand, customary that the Commission 
consults with, or at least informs, the Member States before initiating 
and conducting dispute settlement procedures and there seems to be a 
legal obligation to engage, at least as a general rule, in such practices.81
The situation is more complicated in the case of a mixed agreement 
involving also some or all Member States as contracting parties. At the 
level of representation, it is often possible to ensure a certain unity of 
representation through the Commission. To mention some examples, 
in the WTO dispute settlement context the Commission is always in 
the lead, even in cases brought initially by a third state against one 
or more EU Member States.82 This was also practice before the Treaty 
of Lisbon, when there was also in the WTO context more room for 
areas of shared competence. With Article 207 TFEU, the situation has 
become more straightforwardly one of the Union being the sole proper 
respondent.83 In a recent Regulation laying down Union procedures in 
the field of the common commercial policy it is provided that where the 
Union, as a result of complaints or requests submitted to it pursuant to 
the Regulation, follows international consultation or dispute settlement 
procedures, ‘decisions relating to the initiation, conduct or termination 
of such procedures shall be taken by the Commission’ (but the 
Commission shall keep Member States informed).84
80 See, e.g. Rosas (n 3) 315–20; F Hoffmeister, ‘Of Presidents, High Representatives 
and European Commissioners: The External Representation of the European Union Seven 
Years after Lisbon’ (2017) 1 Europe and the World – A Law Review, forthcoming.
81 See, e.g., Case C-73/14 Council v Commission  (n 13) paras 86–8, where the Court 
stated that in view of the obligation of loyal cooperation, the Commission must, before 
presenting a position in the name of the Union before an international court, consult the 
Council. Compare Article 14(1) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1843; see (n 84) below.
82 Some cases have been initially brought only against one or more Member States (such 
as DS83 – Denmark and DS86 – Sweden – Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights; DS125 – Greece – Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights for Motion 
Pictures and Television Programs) while some cases have been brought either against both 
the EU and its Member States or only against the EU but citing measures taken by Member 
States (e.g. DS174 – EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications; DS 316 – EC and 
Certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft; DS347 – EC and Certain Member States – Large 
Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint).
83 On EU practice in this respect see, e.g. Rosas (n 3) 297–9; Hoffmeister and Ondrusek 
(n 6) 219–22; Hoffmeister (n 6) paras 465–540. See, however, the panel report of 30 June 
2010 in DS316 – EC and Certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft, at paras 7.169–7.177, 
where the EC exceptionally requested – and was denied – an explicit ruling on it being the 
sole proper respondent.
84 Article 14(1) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1843 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 6 October 2015 laying down Union procedures in the field of the common 
commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the Union’s rights under international 
trade rules, in particular those established under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, 
[2015] OJ L272/1. See also Brown and Naglis, in Bungenberg, Reinish and Tietje (n 11) 24.
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In some other instances too, there are explicit provisions in 
secondary law on EU representation. In the Council decision concluding 
the 1995 Convention on Straddling Fish Stocks, which is a mixed 
agreement, it is stated that where the Union initiates a dispute 
settlement procedure as provided for by the agreement, ‘it shall be 
represented by the Commission’, which, however, before it takes any 
action shall consult the Member States (but taking into account binding 
procedural time limits).85 In the same vein, the decision concluding the 
Air Transport Agreement between the EU and its Member States, on 
the one hand, and the USA, on the other hand, of 2007 provides that 
‘the Commission shall represent the [Union] and the Member States in 
arbitration proceedings’ under the agreement.86
Another example is provided by the above-mentioned new 
Regulation establishing a framework for managing financial respon-
sibility linked to investor-to-state dispute settlement, which includes 
fairly detailed rules on not only the apportionment of financial respon-
sibility between the Union and a Member State but also the conduct and 
settlement of disputes.87 If the dispute concerns treatment afforded by 
the Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, the Union shall act 
as sole respondent (arguably as represented by the Commission). If, on 
the other hand, the dispute concerns treatment afforded by a Member 
State, that Member State shall act as a respondent except where the 
Commission, in certain situations, has decided that the Union is to act 
as a respondent. With regard to the latter category of disputes, there 
are rules on cooperation between the Commission and the Member 
State concerned, including the possibility of joint delegations to the 
proceedings.88
As this Regulation demonstrates, there is a close link between 
respondent status and responsibility – and, one may add, between 
responsibility and competence.89 This link has also been made explicit 
85 Council Decision 98/404/EC of 8 June 1999, [1999] OJ L189/14.
86 Decision of the Council and the Representatives of the Member States of the European 
Union, meeting within the Council of 27 April 2007 on the signature and provisional 
application of the agreement, [2007] OJ L134/1, Article 4(1), referring to Article 19 of the 
agreement (arbitration) (see also n 56 above).
87 Regulation (EU) No 912/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
July 2014 establishing a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-
to-state dispute settlement tribunals established by international agreements to which the 
European Union is party, [2014] OJ L257/121. On the preparatory work leading up to this 
Regulation see Brown and Naglis, in Bungenberg, Reinish and Tietje (n 11) 29–34.
88 See Articles 4–12 of Regulation 912/2014.
89 On the apportionment of financial responsibility under Regulation 912/2014 see also 
E Paasivirta, ‘The Responsibility of Member States of International Organizations: A Special 
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in Annex IX to UNCLOS, which contains rules on declarations, notifica-
tions and communications of information relating to the apportionment 
of competence between an international organization and its Member 
States and the implications of such apportionment for responsibility 
and liability, including a rule that failure to respond to requests for 
information may lead to joint and several liability of the EU and a 
Member State.90 In the above-mentioned Advisory Opinion of ITLOS 
relating to flag state responsibility for fishing activities conducted in the 
exclusive economic zone of states other than the flag state, the tribunal 
held, inter alia, that in cases where an international organization (read 
the EU), in the exercise of its exclusive competence, has concluded a 
fisheries access agreement with a third state, which provides for access 
by vessels flying the flag of one of its Member States to fish in the 
exclusive economic zone of the third state, ‘the obligations of the flag 
State become the obligations of the international organization’.91
4.2 agreements concluded by the member states
The above considerations have concerned dispute settlement procedures 
in the context of international agreements to which the EU, or the EU 
and its Member States, are contracting parties, and with regard to 
disputes between them and third states. It remains to say a few words 
about agreements concluded by EU Member States to which the Union 
itself is not a party but which trigger disputes raising issues of Union law 
or Union competence.
Despite the broad treaty-making powers of the Union (see Article 
216 TFEU), there are a number of important agreements, including 
those establishing international organizations, to which it is not a 
party, often because these agreements and organizations are open to 
states only.92 When disputes relating to such agreements arise which 
Case for the European Union’ (2015) 12 Intl Org L Rev 448, 459–60. On responsibility with 
respect to mixed agreements more generally see, e.g. PJ Kuijper, ‘International Responsibility 
for EU Mixed Agreements’ in C Hillion and P Koutrakos (eds), Mixed Agreements Revisited: 
The EU and Its Member States in the World (Hart Publishing 2010) 208; J Heliskoski, ‘EU 
Declarations of Competence and International Responsibility’ in M Evans and P Koutrakos 
(eds), The International Responsibility of the European Union: European and International 
Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2013) 189.
90 Articles 4–7 of Annex IX (Participation by International Organizations) to UNCLOS. 
See also Paasivirta (n 9) 1048–51.
91 Case No 21, Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries 
Commission, 2 April 2015 www.itlos.org/en/cases/list-of-cases, case-no-21/, para 172. 
See also Paasivirta (n 9) 1058–60; Paasivirta (n 89) 457–9, and (n 76) above.
92 See, generally, A Rosas, ‘The Status in EU Law of International Agreements Concluded 
by EU Member States’ (2011) 34 Fordham Intl L J 1304.
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are of relevance for Union law, there may be an interest for the Union 
to participate, in accordance with available mechanisms. This is why 
the Commission has, for instance, presented amicus curiae briefs to 
the European Court of Human Rights;93 such a possibility is nowadays 
also open with respect to the International Court of Justice although 
the Commission has, so far, never submitted any brief to this Court.94 
Especially in areas of exclusive EU competence, the participation of a 
Member State in dispute settlement for instance before the International 
Court of Justice may raise issues of compatibility with Union law.95 Also 
the mere existence of Member States’ agreements with third states may 
in the case of exclusive Union competence be incompatible with Union 
law but such agreements may, under certain conditions, be ‘saved’ by 
Article 351 TFEU if they have been concluded before the Member State 
in question became a member of the EU.96
As to BITs concluded by Member States with third states, a 
Regulation provides for transitional arrangements which allow, under 
certain conditions, the Member States to maintain, and even to conclude, 
such investment agreements but imposes, on the other hand, obligations 
relating, inter alia, to dispute settlement.97 A Member State shall inform 
the Commission of any request for dispute settlement lodged under the 
auspices of the BIT and shall seek the agreement of the Commission before 
activating any dispute settlement mechanism; in both cases, there should 
be cooperation between the Member State and the Commission and this 
may include the participation in the procedure by the Commission.98
Finally, as already noted in section 2.1 above, the question of 
intra-EU disputes between Member States raises, especially in the context 
of mixed agreements, a host of problems which cannot be analysed here 
93 See, e.g. Hoffmeister (n 6) at para 22.
94 ibid at paras 13–15.
95 Hoffmeister, ibid para 16, refers to a case initiated in 2009 by Belgium against 
Switzerland on the interpretation and application of the Lugano Convention of 1988 on 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, a convention 
which the ECJ in 2006 had found to fall under EU exclusive competence (Opinion 1/03 
EU:C:2006:81). Belgium, ‘in concert with the Commission of the European Union’, later 
withdrew the case, ICJ, Order of 5 April 2011.
96 For an example of an agreement concluded by a Member State which according to the 
ECJ it could continue to invoke despite its possible incompatibility with Union law see Case 
C-264/09 Commission v Slovakia EU:C:2011:580. On Article 351 TFEU more generally and 
relevant case law see Rosas (n 92) 1321–4.
97 Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2012 establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements 
between Member States and third countries, [2012] OJ L351/40. See also F Hoffmeister 
and G Ünüvar, ‘From BITS and Pieces towards European Investment Agreements’ in 
Bungenberg, Reinisch and Tietje (n 11) 57, 80–3 and (n 61) above.
98 Article 13 of Regulation 1219/2012.
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in detail. Suffice it to note that Article 344 TFEU, according to which the 
Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the inter-
pretation or application of Union law to any other method of settlement 
than those provided for in the Treaties, may constitute an obstacle 
to submitting disputes between the Member States relating to mixed 
agreements to mechanisms set up under these agreements, in so far as 
the dispute relates to provisions where there is a Union competence.99
This question has become particularly important with respect 
to intra-EU investor-to-state disputes relating not only to the Energy 
Charter Treaty (a mixed agreement) but also to BITs concluded between 
Member States. As the EU has not been a party to these disputes, and as 
the arbitration tribunals have not considered themselves in a position 
to request preliminary rulings from the ECJ,100 the Commission has 
had to settle for the presentation of amicus curiae briefs arguing, inter 
alia, that the arbitration tribunal concerned should have declared that 
it lacked jurisdiction. While these tribunals have not been convinced 
by such arguments,101 the Commission has also initiated infringement 
actions against Member States for failure to terminate intra-EU BITs.102 
Moreover, in the Micula case, now pending before the EU General 
 99 The leading case with respect to mixed agreements is, of course, Case C-459/03 
Commission v Ireland (‘Mox Plant’) EU:C:2006:345, in which Ireland was condemned for 
having initiated an arbitration procedure against the United Kingdom on matters partly 
falling under UNCLOS.
100 In most cases, arbitration tribunals have not been recognized as ‘courts or tribunals’ 
under Article 267 TFEU; see, e.g. Case 102/81 Nordsee EU:C:1982:107, paras 10–12; Case 
C-126/97 Eco Swiss EU:C:1999:269, para 34. There is an ongoing discussion, however, 
as to whether investment tribunals, in particular, could not be viewed differently. Suffice 
it to mention here the Opinion of 17 March 2016 of Wathelet AG, para 59 fn 34, in 
Case C-567/14 Genentech EU:C:2016:526, who, in referring to J Basedow, ‘EU Law in 
International Arbitration: Referrals to the European Court of Justice’ (2015) 32 J Intl Arb 
367, states that the arbitral tribunals acting under the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) ‘could be regarded’ as being able to refer questions to 
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, and P Paschalidis, ‘Arbitral Tribunals and Preliminary 
References to the EU Court of Justice’ (2016) 32 Arbitration International (Advance Access 
published 31 July 2016), doi: 10.1093/arbint/aiw026.
101 An example is provided by the Eureko v Slovak Republic Arbitration, Award on 
Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension of 26 October 2010, PCA Case No 2008-13. This 
case, under the changed name of Achnea v Slovak Republic, was subsequently reviewed by a 
German court, which ultimately submitted the conformity of the arbitration award with EU 
law to the ECJ; see below (n 104). In some cases, the Commission participation may have 
influenced the substantive outcome of the case; see Hoffmeister and Ünüvar (n 97) 60.
102 See, e.g. Paasivirta (n 48) paras 9–12. See also Commission Press Release of 18 June 
2015: ‘Commission asks Member States to terminate their intra-EU bilateral investment 
treaties’. See, more generally, e.g. A Dimopoulos, ‘The Validity and Applicability of 
International Investment Agreements between EU Member States under EU and International 
Law’ (2011) 48 CML Rev 63; S Hindelang, ‘Circumventing Primacy of EU Law and the CJEU’s 
Monopoly by Resorting to Dispute Settlement Mechanisms Provided for Inter-se Treaties?: 
The Case of Intra-EU Investment Arbitration’ (2012) 39 LIEI 179; S Miron, ‘The Last Bite of 
BITs: Supremacy of EU Law versus Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2014) 20 ELJ 332.
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Court, the Commission adopted a decision prohibiting Romania from 
complying with an arbitral award rendered under a Swedish–Romanian 
BIT, holding that paying compensation to the private investors would 
amount to state aid incompatible with the internal market.103
At the time of writing, there is also a request for a preliminary 
ruling from a German court pending before the ECJ and concerning the 
enforcement of an arbitral award rendered by an arbitration tribunal 
constituted under a Dutch–Slovakian BIT.104 The national court asks 
whether the application of an investor-to-state arbitration provision in 
an intra-EU BIT would be contrary to Articles 344, 267 or 18 TFEU.
5. Concluding remarks
As an article on EU and international dispute settlement published by the 
present author in 2003 demonstrated, the 1990s saw a heightened interest 
of the EU in international mechanisms for the third-party settlement of 
disputes.105 These developments should no doubt be seen against the 
background of an increased awareness of the EU as a global player and 
an active subject of international law. Subsequently, this tendency has 
continued and even been strengthened, and the Union is today party 
to a number of international agreements providing for compulsory and 
binding arbitration. This development is especially noteworthy in the case 
of bilateral trade agreements concluded by the EU with European, Middle 
East, Latin American and African third countries in particular.
It is true that the latter arbitration mechanisms have, so far, not 
been used in practice. The submission of trade disputes to the WTO 
system continues unabated, however, and the Union has also become 
involved in some dispute settlement procedures under UNCLOS and 
has recently, inter alia, initiated an arbitration procedure against the 
United States for alleged failure to respect the ‘Open Skies’ Agreement. 
The case law of the ECJ has confirmed that in international dispute 
settlement, the Union is represented by the Commission. As there are a 
103 Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1470 of 30 March 2015, [2015] OJ L232/43, 
in particular paras 102–4. The arbitral award, Micula v Romania, was rendered on 11 
December 2013. While a legal challenge before the EU General Court against a Commission 
decision to issue a suspension injunction of 26 May 2014 was later discontinued, Case 
T-646/14, Order of 29 February 2016, two actions of annulment against the final 
Commission decision, Cases T-694/15 V Micula and Others v Commission and T-704/15 
I Micula v Commission, are pending.
104 Case C-28 4/16 Achmea.
105 Rosas (n 3).
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number of agreements and international organizations to which the EU 
is not a party, the Union, as represented by the Commission, has in 
many instances had to settle for amicus curiae briefs and/or action taken 
against Member States for failure to respect Union competence.
While the ECJ, mainly in a string of Opinions given on the compat-
ibility of international agreements envisaged with Union law, has 
accepted that the Union, as a subject of international law, may engage 
in third-party settlement, the Court has also spelled out some conditions 
and caveats in this respect and has turned down some arrangements as 
intruding excessively on the EU constitutional order (notably the first 
versions of the EEA Agreement, of the agreement on a unified patent 
litigation system and of the agreement providing for the accession of the 
EU to the ECHR). In the light of these Opinions, particularly sensitive 
problem areas are the possible repercussions of a certain interpreta-
tion of an international agreement for the interpretation of EU internal 
rules which have inspired the drafting of the agreement, the possible 
implications for the powers of the CJEU and national EU courts of the 
dispute settlement mechanism as provided for in the agreement and, in 
the context of mixed agreements, the question of the determination of 
the proper respondent (EU or Member State, or both).
The ISDS mechanisms contemplated for investment agreements 
negotiated between the EU and third countries have, particularly in the 
context of the CETA Agreement with Canada and the TTIP negotiations 
with the United States, triggered a vivid debate about both the political 
expediency of such mechanisms and their compatibility with the EU 
legal order. The ECJ will probably shortly be seized by a Belgian request 
for an Opinion on whether the ISDS mechanism of CETA is EU-law 
compatible. A Commission request for an Opinion (2/15) on whether an 
agreement with Singapore should be concluded as a Union only or as a 
mixed agreement is already in an advanced stage of adjudication before 
the ECJ. This Opinion also raises the question of the ISDS mechanism 
provided for in the agreement, albeit in terms of competence (exclusive 
or shared?). In addition, cases relating to the compatibility of intra-EU 
ISDS mechanisms with EU law are currently pending before the General 
Court and the ECJ, respectively.
Once again, the Luxembourg courts are faced with difficult and 
delicate questions relating to the external relations of the EU, and the 
judicial decisions to be taken will hopefully bring further clarification 
on some important issues surrounding the use, in an EU context, of 
mechanisms for third-party settlement of international disputes.
